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LIST OF PARTIES
There are two parties to this case: Petitioner/Appellant SHANE NEBEKER
(referred to herein as "Father") and Respondent/Appellee TRISHA ANN ORTON
(referred to herein as "Mother").

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction exists under Utah Code section 78A-4-103(2)(j).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue 1: Are the district court's factual findings properly supported by the
evidence presented at trial?

Standard of review: '" A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence concerns
the trial court's findings of fact. Those findings will not be disturbed unless they are
ij,

clearly erroneous."' Bond v. Bond, 2018 UT App 38, iJ 6 (quoting Kimball v. Kimball,
2009 UT App 233, iJ 14,217 P.3d 733).

Issue 2: Did the district court abuse its discretion in awarding permanent custody
that differed from the temporary custody arrangement existing prior to trial?

Standard of review: The Court of Appeals reviews custody determinations by
the trial court under an abuse of discretion standard, "giving the district court broad
discretion to make custody awards." K.P.S. v. E.J.P., 2018 UT App 5, ,r 24; see also

Risher v. Emerson, 2017 UT App 216, ,r 3 ("We will 'affirm the trial court's custody
award so long as the trial court's discretion is exercised within the confines of the legal
standards we have set, and the facts and reasons for the decision are set forth fully in
appropriate findings and conclusions.'") (quoting Grindstaff v. Grindstaff, 2010 UT App
4
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261, iJ 3,241 P.3d 365).
~

Preservation of issue/Grounds for review: Father failed to preserve this issue

for appellate review. "When a party fails to raise and argue an issue in the trial court, it
has failed to preserve the issue, and an appellate court will not typically reach that issue
absent a valid exception to preservation." State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, iJ 15 (citing
Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, iJ 12, 266 P.3d 828. "'An issue is preserved for

appeal when it has been presented to the district court in such a way that the court has an
opportunity to rule on it.'" Id. at iJ 15 (quoting Patterson at, 12). "'To provide the court
with this opportunity, the issue must be specifically raised by the party asserting error, in
a timely manner, and must be supported by evidence and relevant legal authority."' Id. at

,r 15 (quoting State ex rel. D.B., 2012 UT 65, ,r 17, 289 P.3d 459).
This preservation rule promotes judicial economy by "giving the district court an
opportunity to address the claimed error, and if appropriate, correct it prior to appeal."
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Jordan River Restoration Network, 2012 UT 84, iJ 28,299 P.3d

990. The rule also promotes fairness by "giving an opposing party an opportunity to
address the alleged error in the district court" and by "prevent[ing] a party from avoiding
an issue at trial for strategic reasons only to raise the issue on appeal if the strategy fails."
Id. at iJ 28.

Here, Father claims that he "raised the issue of physical custody and the
corresponding issue of parent-time in his Paternity Petitioner" and these were the sole
issues addressed at trial. See Appellant's Brief at p. 7. This is insufficient to show that
Father properly preserved the alleged error he claims for appeal. True the parties and
5
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court addressed the general issues of custody and parent-time at trial. However, after
receiving the trial court's ruling cantaining the alleged errors, Father did nothing to raise
these errors with the court. Father filed an objection to the form of the proposed divorce
decree submitted by Mother's counsel but did not raise the substantive objections to the

(filj

court's rulings that he now raises on appeal. R. 75-77. At no point did Father present to
the trial court that it had erred by not giving appropriate weight to the prior custody
arrangement or by failing to award Father additional parent-time. Father has thus failed
to properly preserve these arguments, and the Court of Appeals should deny his requests
~

on that grounds.
Issue 3: Did the district court abuse its discretion in making its award of parent-

time to Father?
~

Standard of review: The Court of Appeals reviews custody determinations by

the trial court under an abuse of discretion standard, "giving the district court broad
discretion to make custody awards." K.P.S. v. E.J.P., 2018 UT App 5, ,I 24; see also

~

Risher v. Emerson, 2017 UT App 216, ,I 3 ("We will 'affirm the trial court's custody

award so long as the trial court's discretion is exercised within the confines of the legal
ft,

standards we have set, and the facts and reasons for the decision are set forth fully in
appropriate findings and conclusions."') (quoting Grindstaff v. Grindstaff, 2010 UT App
261, ,I 3, 241 P.3d 365).

{ig:J

Preservation of issue/Grounds for review: Father failed to preserve this issue

for appellate review. "When a party fails to raise and argue an issue in the trial court, it
has failed to preserve the issue, and an appellate court will not typically reach that issue
6
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absent a valid exception to preservation." State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, iJ 15 (citing

Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, iJ 12, 266 P.3d 828. "'An issue is preserved for
appeal when it has been presented to the district court in such a way that the court has an
opportunity to rule on it."' Id. at iJ 15 (quoting Patterson at 112). "'To provide the court
with this opportunity, the issue must be specifically raised by the party asserting error, in
a timely manner, and must be supported by evidence and relevant legal authority."' Id. at

iJ 15 (quoting State ex rel. D.B., 2012 UT 65, iJ 17, 289 P.3d 459).
This preservation rule promotes judicial economy by "giving the district court an
~

opportunity to address the claimed error, and if appropriate, correct it prior to appeal."

Salt Lake City Corp. v. Jordan River Restoration Network, 2012 UT 84, iJ 28,299 P.3d
990. The rule also promotes fairness by "giving an opposing party an opportunity to
address the alleged error in the district court" and by "prevent[ing] a party from avoiding
an issue at trial for strategic reasons only to raise the issue on appeal if the strategy fails."

Id. at iJ 28.
Here, Father claims that he "raised the issue of physical custody and the
corresponding issue of parent-time in his Paternity Petitioner" and these were the sole
issues addressed at trial. See Appellant's Brief at p. 7. This is insufficient to show that
Father properly preserved the alleged error he claims for appeal. True the parties and
court addressed the general issues of custody and parent-time at trial. However, after
receiving the trial court's ruling containing the alleged errors, Father did nothing to raise
these errors with the court. Father filed an objection to the form of the proposed divorce
decree submitted by Mother's counsel but did not raise the substantive objections to the
7
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court's rulings that he now raises on appeal. R. 75-77. At no point did Father present to
the trial court that it had erred by not giving appropriate weight to the prior custody
arrangement or by failing to award Father additional parent-time. Father has thus fail~d
to properly preserve these arguments, and the Court of Appeals should deny his requests
on that grounds.

DETERMINATIVE LAW
~

There are no laws whose interpretation is determinative or of central importance to
this appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a dispute over custody of and parent-time with the parties' minor child.

TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION
In October 2015, Father filed his paternity petition. R. 1-4. Mother answered
shortly thereafter. R. 8-9. The parties subsequently entered a stipulated temporary
custody and parent-time arrangement which was never expressly ordered by the trial
court. R. 65. On October 21, 2016 and November 8, 2016, the court held a bench trial
on the issues of custody and parent-time. R. 57-60. On December 27, 2016, the trial
court entered its Memorandum Decision with Findings ofFact and Conclusions ofLaw,
which incorporated its trial rulings. R. 62-70. On April 14, 2017, Mother's counsel filed
a proposed Paternity Decree based on the court's earlier Memorandum Decision. R. 7896. That same day, Father's counsel objected to the form of the proposed Decree (but not
the substance of the court's rulings). R. 75-77. On May 1, 2017, the court issued its final
8
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Amended Decree and Order ofPaternity, Custody, Parent-time and Support. R. 131142.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The parties are the parents of one minor son (G.O.N.) born December 6, 2013. R.
175 at 5:23-25. Mother and Father have known each other for over 20 years, and had
dated in the past. R. 175 at 35:24-36:7, 45: 13-46: 1.
Both parents have had troubled pasts. Father has a history of criminal activity,
including multiple DUis. R257 at 56: 19-57:7. Father has been incarcerated multiple
times in the past. R. 257 at 91: 18-92:2. Father has a history of drug use in the past with
Mother. R. 257 at 46:2-24. Mother has also had a history of separate drug use and even
selling drugs, but has been clean for over a year at the time of trial. R. 175 at 31:16-33:3,
44:10-16.
The parties separated before the child was born. R. 257 at 58:12-18. For
approximately the first year of the child's life, Mother lived with her parents in Elsinore,
Utah, and Father also lived in Sevier County. R. 175 at 28:2-10, R. 257 at 7: 19, 102: 1213. Father first saw the child at Mother's home a couple of weeks after he was born, and

then again a couple weeks after that. R. 175 at 35:3-8, R. 257 at 58:29-60: 15. Mother
did not allow Father to take the child from her care during these visits because he was a
nursing infant and because Mother wanted Father to get to know the child first. R. 175 at
35:9-21, R. 257 at 61:2-13.
After those first two visits, Father did not see the child against for approximately a
year and a half, until May 2015. R. 257 at 29:11-18, 60:17-19. Mother testified that she
9
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welcomed Father to see the child at her home anytime. R. 175 at 35:9-21. Father
admitted that Mother told him that he could come and see the child, but he did not do so
because it would have been uncomfortable for him. R. 257 at 61:1-13. Father never
asked to take the child to his home in Richfield for visitations until after he turned one.

~

R. 257 at 61: 8-13. Father did not provide any financial support to Mother for the child
during those first 18 months of his life. R. 175 at 51 :20-23.
Father claims that he did all he could to see his son, but he did not file for
paternity, custody or parent-time until October 2015, when the child was nearly two years
old. R. 1-4.
In May 2015, Mother allowed the child to go see Father to allow them to start
getting to know each other, and Father surreptitiously took the child from Mother and
~

kept him. R. 175 at 38: 10-24, 48: 1-13. Father soon limited contact between Mother and
the child and Mother did not see the child for months. R. 175 at 46:14-18, 48:16-21.
Starting in approximately January 2016, the parties agreed to a temporary custody
and parent-time arrangement where they shared joint custody of the child. R. 175 at
40:21-41: 11. Mother only agreed to this arrangement reluctantly after feeling like she
~

had been bullied into it by Father. R. 175 at 49: 19-50: 10.
Father admitted that the child was doing really well at both his home and Mother's
home. R. 257 at 140:17-21. The district court also noted that the child has been doing
well with having both parents in his life over the past year prior to trial. R. 65, 66. Based
on these findings, the court concluded that it likely would have awarded joint physical
GiJ

custody to both parents "[i]f the parties were living in the same community, or within a
10
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reasonably close distance from each other." R. 68 (fn. 3).
However, the court found that the parties resided over 100 miles away from each
other, and that both parties intended to continue living in their current communities (3).

R. 64, R. 175 at 51 :3-15. Given this geographic reality, Father repeatedly acknowledged
that the temporary schedule would not work when the child started school. R. 257 at
80:10-81 :6, 101:20-102:5, 104:22-105:4. Father acknowledged that the purpose of trial
was to implement a permanent custody and parent-time arrangement that would work
when the child started school. R. 257 at 80: 10-81 :6.
Father is married to Tiffany (for the second time), and they have one child
together, a ten-year-old daughter. R. 175 at 60: 10-61 :9. Tiffany's two other children (16
and 15) from a prior relationship also live with her and Father. R. 175 at 61 :9-16. Father
lives in Annabelle, Utah in a home he remodeled. R. 257 at 9: 14-18. The child has his
own bedroom and bed at Father's home. R. 257 at 22:23-23:4.
Father works as a supervisor at a local mine. R. 257 at 47: 12-48:3. Father works
approximately 14 days per month with rotating 12-hour shifts. R. 257 at 48:19-49:14.
For four of those days, Father works graveyard shifts where he is home sleeping during
the day. R. 257 at 50:25-51 :22. Father's work is approximately 45 minutes away from
his home, adding another approximately 2 hours that he is away from him on his work
days. R. 257 at 87: 1-9.
Mother has four other children besides G.O.N. whose ages are 25, 21, 18 and 11.
The 11-year-old lives full time with Mother. R. 175 at 28: 18-29:3. At the time of trial,
Mother lived with her brother-in-law. R. 175 at 24:9-11. The child had his own bed but
11
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shares a bedroom with Mother. R. 175 at 40:4-11. Mother anticipated moving into her
own home soon but planned to stay in Utah County. R. 175 at 51:3-15.
Mother works at a convenience store in Santaquin, Utah generally Monday
through Thursday 10:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. R. 175 at 21:2-22:2. Mother's 21-year-old
daughter provides care for the child while Mother is working. R. 175 at 42:22-43: 1.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Father has failed to meet his burden to show that the district court's factual
findings are unsupported by the evidence. Father points to evidence that would
arguably support the factual findings he wants, but completely ignores or discounts the
substantial amount of evidence that clearly supports the district courts factual findings.
Father fails to identify the supporting evidence that the district court relied on and
completely fails to demonstrate any flaws in such evidence which would make the court's
reliance clearly erroneous.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding permanent custody
that differed from the temporary custody arrangement existing prior to trial. For
the first two years of the child's life, he did not have the benefit of both of his parents
being actively involved at the same time. He lived exclusively with Mother for the first
year-and-a-half with very little contact from Father. Father then underhandedly took him,
and the child had very little contact with Mother for the next six months.
Then, approximately ten months before trial, the parties agreed upon a temporary
joint physical custody arrangement that gave Father slightly more parent-time than
Mother. The district court found that the minor child was well-adjusted to and doing well
12
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with this new arrangement where both parties were in his life, and Father admitted that
the child was doing well in both homes.
However, as Father repeatedly acknowledged, this temporary arrangement could
not continue when the child started school as the parties lived over 100 miles apart and
both intended to remain in the current communities. Indeed, Father acknowledged that
the purpose of trial was to implement a permanent custody and parent-time arrangement
that would work when the child started school.
Because the temporary joint physical custody arrangement could not continue, the
court had no choice but to reluctantly depart from that arrangement and the stability that
it had provided the child for the first time in his life. Rather, the court was forced to rely
on other factors and evidence to determine the best interests of the child with a custody
schedule that would have to account for the parties' distance from each other and would,
by necessity, favor one parent over the other. Under these circumstances, the court did
not abuse its discretion in awarding primary physical custody to Mother even though it
differed from the temporary joint physical custody arrangement that the parties had
followed prior to trial.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in making its award of parenttime to Father. The court awarded Father liberal parent-time in excess of the minimum

statutory schedule for a child the age of the parties' minor child. Father failed to meet his
burden to show that more parent-time is in the child's best interest based on the relevant
statutory factors. To the contrary, the evidence available to the court shows that joint
physical custody will not work in this case where the parties live over 100 miles apart and
13
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intend to remain so. Under the circumstances, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding Father parent-time that is similar (but more generous) than the
statutory schedules.
ARGUMENTS

I.

FATHER HAS NOT MET HIS BURDEN TO SHOW THAT THE
DISTRICT COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS ARE UNSUPPORTED BY
THE EVIDENCE.
"' A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence concerns the trial court's findings

of fact. Those findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous.'" Bond v.
Bond, 2018 UT App 38, ,r 6 (quoting Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, ,r 14,217

P.3d 733). "The existence of conflicting evidence is not sufficient to set aside a trial
court's finding .... [rather] 'a finding is clearly erroneous only if it is in conflict with the
clear weight of the evidence."' Id. at ,r 6 (quoting Kidd v. Kidd, 2014 UT App 26, ,r 19,
321 P.3d 200).
"[T]o successfully challenge the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a trial
court's factual finding, 'the appellant must overcome the healthy dose of deference owed
to factual findings by identifying and dealing with the supportive evidence and
demonstrating the legal problem in that evidence, generally through marshaling the
evidence."' Shuman v. Shuman, 2017 UT App 192, ,r 8, 406 P.3d 258 (quoting Taft v.
Taft, 2016 UT App 135, ,r 19, 379 P.3d 890). The challenging party cannot meet its

burden "by simply listing or rehashing the evidence and arguments they presented during
trial or by merely pointing to evidence that might have supported findings more favorable
to them." Id. at 1 8. Rather "they must identify flaws in the evidence relied on by the
14
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Gi.>

trial court that rendered the trial court's reliance on it, and the findings resulting from it,
clearly erroneous." Id. "A party challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 'will almost
certainly fail to carry its burden of persuasion on appeal if it fails to marshal' the
evidence in support of the challenged finding." Id. at 13 (quoting State v. Nielsen, 2014
UT I 0, 142, 326 P.3d 645).

A. Evidence supports the court's finding that Father has had a period in his life
when he was less than a fit parent.
The court made the following finding regarding Father's past fitness:
Both parties have a history of using illegal drugs and violating the law.
Both parties acknowledged past deficiencies in their parenting abilities. In
essence, both parties have had periods in their life when they have been less
than fit parents.
R. 65. There is ample evidence in the record of Father's history of illegal drug use and
criminal activity (Father admitted that he has a history of criminal activity, including
multiple DUis (R257 at 56: 19-57:7); Father admitted that he has been incarcerated
multiple times in the past (R. 257 at 91: 18-92:2); Father admitted that he has a history of
drug use in the past with Mother (R. 257 at 46:2-24).
Father argues that this evidence only related to the period in his life before the
birth of G.O.N. and therefore does not show that he has ever been less than a fit parent.
But there is other evidence supporting the court's finding on this point, including that
Father declined to see the child for months even though invited to do so because he felt
"uncomfortable" (R. 257 at 61: 1-13), and that Father did not provide any financial
support for the child for the first year and a half of his life (R. 175 at 51 :20-23).
Regardless, any error by the court in making this finding is harmless as it clearly
15
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did not effect the court's custody decision. The court went on to say
However, at the present time both parties contribute financially to the
welfare of their child; and both parties spend appropriate time with, and
provide appropriate emotional support to the minor child. Essentially, both
parents are fit parents.
~

R. 65.

B. Evidence supports the court's finding that the evidence relating to past
conduct and moral standards is equally balanced between the parties.
The court made the following findings regarding the parties' past conduct and
moral standards:
In this case, both parties have had drug problems, have committed crimes
and engaged in extra marital sexual relations. While Father cleaned his life
up sooner than Mother, there is insufficient evidence for this Court to make
a decision as to whether one of the parties' past conduct was better or worse
than the other. Particularly because the evidence at trial established that
much of the bad conduct engaged by the parties, was accomplished
together. For a considerable period of time each party engaged in bad
conduct with the other party's knowledge and consent; at least tacitly.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the evidence relating to past conduct and
moral standards is equally balanced between the parties; for both good and
bad.
R. 65-66. Father readily points out the evidence of Mother's past conduct but completely

ignores the evidence of Father's past conduct, which includes:
•
•
•
•
•

Father admitted that he has a history of criminal activity, including multiple DUis.
R257 at 56:19-57:7.
Father admitted that he has been incarcerated multiple times in the past. R. 257 at
91: 18-92:2.
Father admitted that he has a history of drug use in the past with Mother, including
using "lots of meth." R. 257 at 46:2-24.
Father committed extramarital sexual relations with Mother. R. 175 at 30:7-10.
Father underhandedly took the child from Mother's care. R. 175 at 38:10-24,
48:1-13.
Father's burden is to address this evidence and demonstrate how and why the
16
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~

~

court clearly erred in relying on it to determine that the parties' past conduct and moral
standards were equally balanced. Father does not do this. Rather, he simply argues that
the court should have put much more weight on Mother's past conduct. However, it is
within the discretion of the district court to determine credibility and the weight placed on
certain evidence, and the Court of Appeals is not here to re-weight such evidence.
Further, it is within the discretion of the district court to determine how much certain past
conduct affects a party's parenting ability, and the court clearly found that, although the
parties' past conduct was not identical, its effect on their parenting ability is.
C. Evidence supports the court's finding regarding which parent is more likely
to act in the child's best interests.
The court made the ultimate finding that "the evidence is equally balanced relating
to which party is more likely to act in the child's best interest." R. 67. This was based on
several subsidiary findings and supporting evidence:
•

The court found that "[b]oth parties acknowledged that the minor child needs a
relationship, and needs to spend substantial time with, the other parent." R. 66.
This finding is supported by Mother's testimony (R. 175 at 38: 1-9, 50:20-22) and
Father's testimony (R. 257 at 50:9-52:8, 72: 12-74:21).

•

The court found that "Father underhandedly took possession of the minor child
when he surreptitiously took the child .... [and] kept the child from Mother for
some time." R. 66. This finding is supported by Mother's testimony. R. 175 at
38: 10-24, 48: 1-13.

•

The court found that both parties eventually agreed to and cooperated in following
a parent-time schedule which gave them both substantial time with the child. This
finding is supported by Mother's testimony (R. 175 at 58:7-16) and Father's
testimony (R. 257 at 50:9-52:8, 72:12-74:21).

Gj

Father does not address these subsidiary findings by the court or evidence
supporting them. Rather, Father simply points to other evidence of wrongdoing by
17
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Mother and good behavior by Father and argues that the court should have found
otherwise. This does not meet his burden. Again, it is within the district court's
discretion to determine the amount of weight to give the evidence, and Father has not
shown that the court "clearly erred" in relying primarily on the evidence listed above.

D. Evidence supports the court's finding that Father, through his inaction,
tacitly acknowledged that the child's best interest were being served by living
primarily with Mother.
The court found that
Prior to the time Father became concerned enough with Mother's drug use
that he took self-help action, Father was content to allow the child to live
primarily with Mother. The Court considers such action (or non-action) on
the part of Father to be a tacit acknowledgement that the best interests of
the minor child were being best served by the child living primarily with
Mother.
R. 67. Father claims that the court in making this finding because he "did everything he

could legally do to gain custody of G.O.N. once he know he was his father." Appellant's
Brief at p. 21. That claim is simply not supported by the evidence.
Father only visited the child twice during the first year and a half of his life. R.
257 at 29:11-18, 60:17-19. Mother testified that she welcomed Father to see the child at
her home anytime. R. 175 at 35:9-21. Father admitted that Mother told him that he could
come and see the child, but he did not do so because it would have been "uncomfortable"
for him. R. 257 at 61: 1-13. Father never asked to take the child to his home in Richfield
~

for visitations until after he turned one. R. 257 at 61 :8-13. Most tellingly, father did not
file with the court for paternity, custody or parent-time until October 2015, when the
child was nearly two years old. R. 1-4. This evidence amply supports the court's
18
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findings about Father's inaction.
E. Evidence supports the court's finding that Mother was the child's primary
caretaker for the majority of this life.

The court made the finding that Mother has been the child's primary caregiver for
the majority of his life. R. 67-68. This finding is supported by Father's own testimony
wherein he admits that the child lived exclusively with Mother from the time of his birth
in November2013 until May 2015. R. 257 at 29:11-18, 60:17-19. It is also supported by
the parties' testimony that they shared joint physical custody (albeit with more parenttime for Father), from January 2016 until the court's ruling. R. 175 at 40:21-41: 11; R.
257 at 140: 17-21. Father only had exclusive custody of the child for approximately
seven months (from the end of May 2015 to January 2016). Further, during the time
while the child was at Father's home, his wife (Tiffany) provided much of the actual care
of the child. R. 257 at 14:10-15:12.
Father argues that the court may legally only consider the caretaking that occurred
once a party files for custody and not during the child's life prior. See Appellant's Brief
at p. 22 ("It is not who the child has lived with the majority of his life, but who the child
has lived with once a party initiates legal action."). That position is contrary to Utah law
and basic logic. It would require a court to give primary caretaker status to a parent who
filed for custody six weeks before a temporary orders hearing even though the other
parent had exclusively raised the child for five years before that. It would reward
procedural posturing and even wrongdoing, where, like here, a parent obtains custody of
a child through underhandedness. See Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1988)
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("[I]f the primary caregiver gained that status wrongfully, courts should be careful not to
reward such conduct by giving the wrongdoer a consequential advantage in evaluating
the custody question.").
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
AWARDING PERMANENT CUSTODY THAT DIFFERED FROM THE
TEMPORARY CUSTODY ARRANGEMENT EXISTING PRIOR TO
TRIAL.

For approximately ten months prior to trial, the parties had been following a
stipulated temporary parent-time schedule that gave them joint physical custody of their
minor child, with Father having a slight majority of the parent-time. Father argues that
the trial court abused its discretion in awarding primary custody to Mother where the
child was well adjusted and doing well under the temporary custody arrangement. Father
is incorrect. The trial court properly exercised its discretion under the circumstances
where the temporary custody arrangement would clearly not work long-term and could
not continue into the future.
A. The district court acted within its discretion in giving less weight to the
temporary custody arrangement.

The court is not obligated to place as much weight on a temporary custody
arrangement that existed prior to trial. This very issue was addressed in detail by the
Utah Supreme Court in Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209 (Utah 1996). There, the mother
had obtained temporary custody of the parties' minor child for approximately a year and
a half prior to trial. Id. at p. 1210-11. The trial court eventually awarded custody of the
child to the father. Id. The mother argued that the trial court abused its discretion in
discounting the temporary custody period quoting Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599, 604
20
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(Utah 1989) that "a lengthy custody arrangement in which a child has thrived ought
rarely, if at all, to be disturbed, and then only if the circumstances are compelling." The
Supreme Court distinguished the case from Elmer, which involved a proposed
modification to a permanent custody award, to the Tucker case which involved only a
temporary custody order. Id. at p. 1215. The Supreme Court expressly stated that
A temporary order is only that, temporary. It is effective only until a fully
informed custody determination can be made at a final hearing. Temporary
custody is not to be treated as permanent custody.... If a temporary order
of custody were to be given permanent status ... no party would ever
stipulate to a temporary arrangement and every hearing on temporary
custody would involve the time-consuming presentation of witnesses, both
lay and expert, as well as other types of evidence. In short, a temporary
custody hearing would become a permanent custody hearing. Accordingly,
this court has held that a temporary custody order should not be given the
weight of a permanent order.

Tucker v. Tucker at p. 1215-16.
Here, while it is true that Father had the majority of the time with the child for the
year before trial, it was based on a temporary custody arrangement which Mother had
only reluctantly agreed to. Therefore, the court acted within its discretion in affording
less weight to this temporary period than with a prior permanent custody order.

B. The district court acted within its discretion in varying from the temporary
custody arrangement that could not continue into the future.
"The importance of the myriad of factors used in determining a child's best
interests ranges from the possibly relevant to the critically important. At the critically
important end of the spectrum, when the child is thriving, happy, and well-adjusted, lies
continuity of placement." Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 UT 290, ,I 26, 989 P.2d 491.
"However, not all continuity is alike. A heavy emphasis on preserving stability
21
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presupposes that the prior arrangement is not only satisfactory, but will in fact continue."

Id. at ,r 27. "When maintaining one parent's primary physical custody will not truly
preserve stability and continuity in the child's life, the court may find less compelling
circumstances are sufficient to modify the custody order." Id. at ,r 27.
Here, for the first two years of the child's life, he did not have the benefit of both
of his parents being actively involved at the same time. He lived exclusively with Mother
~

for the first year-and-a-half with very little contact from Father. R. 175 at 28:2-10,
29: 11-18, 35:3-21,; R. 257 at 7: 19, 58: 12-18, 58:29-60: 19, 61 :2-13, 102: 12-13. Father
then underhandedly took the child, and the child had very little contact with Mother for
the next six months. R. 66; R. 175 at 38:10-24, 46:14-18, 48:1-21.
Then, approximately ten months before trial, the parties agreed upon a temporary
joint physical custody arrangement that gave Father slightly more parent-time than
Mother. R. 65; R. 175 at 40:21-41:11.
With regards to this pre-trial period, the district court stated the following:
The minor child has been residing with both parents pursuant to a stipulated
temporary parent time schedule that takes into consideration Father's work
schedule. The child is well adjusted and doing very well pursuant to the
current parent time schedule. Both parents deeply love and are committed
to their child, and both parents are extremely motivated to be awarded
physical custody of their child.
R. 65 (emphasis added). In the context of analyzing which party would be more
likely to act in the child's best interest, including allowing frequent and continuing
contact with the other parent, the district court stated:
Based on the evidence presented at trial, this Court finds that for the last
several months the child has been doing very well with both parents; and
22
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that both parties have, to an acceptable degree, cooperated in allowing the
other party to have meaningful parent time. As a result, this Court finds
that the evidence is equally balanced relating to which party is more likely
to act in the child's best interests.
R. 66-67 (emphasis added).

These statements, taken in context, clearly show that the court found that the child
was well-adjusted and doing well with the recent development where both parents were
actively involved in this life as opposed to the first two years of his life. The court never
stated that the child was well-adjusted only in Father's care. Indeed, Father admitted that
the child was doing really well in both his home and Mother's home. R. 257 at 140: 1721. Based on these findings, the court concluded that it likely would have awarded joint
physical custody to both parents "[i]f the parties were living in the same community, or
within a reasonably close distance from each other." R. 68 (fn. 3).
Unfortunately, such a joint physical custody arrangement as had existed prior to
trial could not continue into the future. The parties live over 100 miles apart from each
other and both intend to remain in their current communities. R. 64; R. 175 at 51 :3-15.
As Father repeatedly acknowledged, this temporary arrangement could not continue
when the child started school given this geographic separation between the parties. R.
257 at 80:10-81:6, 101:20-102:5, 104:22-105:4. Indeed, Father acknowledged that the purpose
of trial was to implement a permanent custody and parent-time arrangement that would work
when the child started school. R. 257 at 80: 10-81 :6.

Because the temporary joint physical custody arrangement could not continue, the
court had no choice but to reluctantly depart from that arrangement and the stability that
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it had provided the child for the first time in his life. Rather, the court was forced to rely

Gv
on other factors and evidence to determine the best interests of the child with a custody
schedule that would have to account for the parties' distance from each other and would,
by necessity, favor one parent over the other. Under these circumstances, the court did
not abuse its discretion in awarding primary physical custody to Mother even though it
differed from the temporary joint physical custody arrangement that the parties had
followed prior to trial.

III.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
AWARDING PARENT-TIME TO FATHER.

The trial court found that
it is in the best interests of the minor child that Father be allowed to
exercise liberal and meaningful parent time with the child. At a minimum
Father should be entitled to the aggregate amount of parent time provided
by Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-35; with adjustments being made to that
schedule to ensure Father's parent time is exercised, as much as reasonably
possible, at times Father is off work.

~

R. 68 (emphasis in original). Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
making this parent-time award instead of awarding Father "parent-time in excess of the
minimum guidelines." See Appellant's Brief at p. 24. Father is incorrect.
~

First, Father ignores the fact that the court did indeed award him parent-time in
excess of the minimum guidelines. At the time of trial, the parties' minor child was less
than three years old. The minimum schedule for parent-time for children under five years
of age is set forth in Utah Code section 30-3-35.5, and provides less parent-time than the
aggregate amount of time set forth in section 30-3-35 which the court awarded to Father.
Further, the court awarded Father the aggregate amount of time provided by section 30-324
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35 with favorable adjustments to compensate for Father's schedule. That is also an
award above the minimum provisions set forth in the code.
Regardless, the court did not abuse its discretion in its award of parent-time to
Father. The legislature has already determined that the parent-time schedules set forth in
Utah Code sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5 "shall be presumed to be in the best interests
of the child." Further, these schedules:
shall be considered the minimum parent-time to which the noncustodial
parent and the child shall be entitled unless a parent can establish otherwise
by a preponderance of the evidence that more or less parent-time should be
awarded based upon any of the following criteria:
(a) parent-time would endanger the child's physical health or
significantly impair the child's emotional development;
(b) the distance between the residency of the child and the
noncustodial parent;
(c) a substantial or unfounded allegation of child abuse has been
made;
(d) the lack of demonstrated parenting skills without safeguards to
ensure the child's well-being during parent-time;
(e) the financial inability of the noncustodial parent to provide
adequate food and shelter for the child during periods of parenttime;
(f) the preference of the child if the court determines the child to be
of sufficient maturity;
(g) the incarceration of the noncustodial parent in a county jail,
secure youth corrections facility, or an adult corrections facility;
(h) shared interests between the child and the noncustodial parent;
(i) the involvement or lack of involvement of the noncustodial
parent in the school, community, religious, or other related
activities of the child;
G) the availability of the noncustodial parent to care for the child
when the custodial parent is unavailable to do so because of work
or other circumstances;
(k) a substantial or chronic pattern of missing, cancelling, or denying
regularly scheduled parent-time;
(I) the minimum duration of and lack of significant bonding in the
parents' relationship prior to the conception of the child;
(m) the parent-time schedule of siblings;
25
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(n) the lack of reasonable alternatives to the needs of a nursing child;
and
(o) any other criteria the court determines relevant to the best
interests of the child.
Utah Code section 30-3-34(2).
~

Here, Father makes the vague argument that the evidence established that it is in
the minor child's best interests to be with both parents in excess of the minimum
statutory parent-time. See Appellant's Brief at p. 24. Father completely fails, however,
the show how he met his burden to show that more parent-time is in the child's best
interest based on the factors listed above. Father does not even refer to the factors set
forth in Utah Code section 30-3-34(2).
To the contrary, the evidence shows that joint custody would not work for this
child. The parties live over 100 miles apart, and both parties intend to continue living in
their current communities. R. 64; R. 175 at 51 :3-15. A joint physical custody schedule
would simply not work once the child starts school, which will happen soon. The trial
court implicitly recognized this when it concluded that it likely would have awarded joint
physical custody to both parents "[i]f the parties were living in the same community, or
within a reasonably close distance from each other" but otherwise could not. R. 68 (fn.
3). Under these circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded
Father parent-time that is similar to the schedule set forth in Utah Code section 30-3-35.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the district court's order regarding custody over and
parent-time with the parties' minor child.

THE SCHRIEVER LAW FIRM
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